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The Director ³
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

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Honorable Birch Bayh, Chairman Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the opportunity to review the Senate Select Committee Staff study entitled "Report on the Frank Snepp/Vietnam Case." I appreciate the Committee's objective and dispassionate approach reflected in the report. In April 1978, the Agency completed its own examination of many of Mr. Snepp's allegations. The product of the task force, Report of Working Group on Snepp Book "Decent Interval", was reviewed by the Committee Staff. I am pleased that there are no major differences in the facts as presented in the two reports. There are, however, a few points in the Committee's discussion of Snepp's specific allegations upon which I would like to comment before turning to the Report's principal findings and recommendations.

Allegation 1 and 2: While Mr. Polgar may have believed that some form of negotiation was possible, there is no evidence that he allowed this belief to influence his responsibilities or actions to evacuate CIAconnected Vietnamese, or to encourage the Vietnamese to destroy particularly compromising files. The facts assembled by the Committee Staff, as well as by the Agency Working Group, show that Mr. Polgar did everything he could within his authority in this regard. Hence, I believe both of these allegations are not valid. Regarding the evacuation of CIA-connected Vietnamese, the tempo of the evacuation of Key Intelligence Persons (KIPs) was dictated by (a) availability of transportation, (b) availability of safe haven, (c) authority to move KIPs and (d) willingness of the individual to depart--not necessarily in that order. Furthermore, during the final week of South Vietnam's existence, the Washington policy was "to prop up the Government." Since most of the KIPs were also government officials, military officers or dependents of the same, there was a direct relationship between the departures and the government's ability to survive. Some of the threatened KIPs were also essential to maintain law and order required for the evacuation of the several thousand U.S. citizens still in Vietnam.

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